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General Policy Speech of Prime Ministers
and Fiscal Choices in France: ‘‘Preach Water
and Drink Wine!’’
Martial Foucault and Abel Franc¸ois
Abstract Since the inception of the Fifth French Republic, the PrimeMinister
pronounces an expected inauguration address of general policy in which main
public policies are announced. Usually a hierarchical priority of policies is
raised from this address. As a consequence the government aims at allocating
budgets in accordance with such a ranking. Nevertheless public budgeting
processes are regularly faced with incrementalism, which causes huge pro-
blems when some unexpected problems arise. Furthermore, during the elec-
toral cycle, governments face a paradoxical problem: once elected they are
supposed to transform their electoral promises into public policies but at
the same time they are forced to propose a new electoral platform for being
re-elected.
All along the Fifth Republic in 1958, France has experienced 17 governments
and then 17 addresses of general policy. The regular shift of majority since the
beginning of the 1980s outlines the (in)capacity of incumbent governments to
satisfy a majority of voters. In this perspective, this chapter aims at testing
whether priorities of governmental action are matched with the ranking of
budgetary allocations. For that, we propose to analyze all the 17 addresses of
Prime Ministers with a data text mining technology in order to construct a
dependant hierarchical variable. Thus we use budget series, economic, and
political data as independent variables to estimate the shift of annual budget
according to both the governmental priority and the time distance between
the date of the Prime Minister’s inauguration address and observed annual
budget law.
From a political economy perspective, this chapter tackles the ambiguous
relationship between political address of French Prime Ministers and the bud-
geting response of their government. Using an original statistical database
(47 years), we plan to better understand the relevance of public policy as it is
implemented and not necessarily as the public address should target it.
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8.1 Introduction
In a famous address in 1980, Margaret Thatcher claimed that, ‘‘To those
waiting with bated breath for that favorite media catch-phrase – the U-turn
– I have only one thing to say: you turn if you want to; the lady’s not for
turning.’’ This example, reminded by Montpetit (2008), reveals a rigorist
behavior of the previous Prime Minister that she confirmed by decreasing
public spending. In a sense she made what she promised to do. Are convictions
more powerful than expected results of political action? Is it conceivable that
within a democracy elected governments are inclined to change their initial
positions? For some scholars, such an attitude entails that promises be not
satisfied and then their political legitimacy be depleted. Many empirical
studies have tested the mandate theory by matching emphases of party plat-
forms and government expenditures (Artes and Bustos, 2008; Budge and
Hofferbert, 1990; Pe´try, 1995; Royed, 1996). The main conclusion entails
that about 60–80 percent of pledges contained in parties’ manifestoes are
fulfilled. By relaxing the theoretical framework of mandate theory, another
avenue of research argues that the content analysis of politicians’ speeches
provides a new tool for capturing the decision-maker’s preferences. In this
perspective, Imbeau (Chapter 1 in this volume) advances the concept of
dissonance in policy processes and applies it to different subfields at the
crossroads of political behavior and public policy.
One of the most frequently asked questions by researchers focusing on
the behavior of the governing body is the following: Do politicians practice
what they preach? From a political economy perspective, the relationship
between the appraisal of the incumbent and the probability of victory was
exhaustively discussed in the framework of political economy cycles
through the retrospective vote. At the opposite, however, the place of
electoral promises in the understanding of public policies’ choices was
rarely the object of study. That is why this chapter aims at focusing on
the influence of the general policy address, enunciated by the French Prime
Minister, on fiscal priorities. In other words, we would like to better
understand the relationship between the government’s general policy
speeches (i.e. Throne speeches) and budgetary actions, understood here
as a tangible measure of public action.
The chapter is structured into four parts. The first section describes
the content of the French Prime Ministers’ general policy speeches since
1958 and the political context in which it was enunciated. The second
section reminds the expected effects between political discourse and bud-
get allocation decision. The third section presents the data used: lexico-
graphic data issued from a computer data mining and budget data for
nine ministries. Diagnostics and econometric estimations are developed in
a fourth section, followed by a discussion of results and concluding
remarks.
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8.2 General Policy Speeches of French Prime Ministers:
Framework, Stakes, and Shape
In the following section, we present the institutional framework in which
the general policy inauguration address of French Prime Ministers takes
place. We must, indeed, go back to the place this particular function in the
French diarchy in order to comprehend the importance of the inauguration
address.
8.2.1 The Role of the Prime Minister in the Fifth Republic
The French executive power is characterized by an important diarchy. Indeed,
the executive power is shared between the President of the Republic and the
Prime Minister, but this power sharing is not on an equal basis since they both
derive their legitimacy from different sources, and that the Prime Minister is
clearly the President’s subordinate.
First, the source of their respective legitimacy is totally advantageous to
the President. The President of the Republic anchors his power on the fact
that he is elected by direct universal suffrage. At the opposite, the Prime
Minister is directly nominated by the President of the French Republic.
His nomination answers to the full discretion of the President of the
French Republic. No rule is set, whether formalized by the Constitution
or an implicit rule coming from the practice, since the Prime Minister can
be an experienced politician known to the general public like M. Rocard,
or an unknown administrator, unknown to the general public and without
any political experience like R. Barre, or even very close collaborators to
the President like M. Debre´ or P. Be´re´govoy.
In a similar fashion, if the Constitution foresees the question of the Prime
Minister’s destitution in a sibylline manner since the ‘‘the President of the
French Republic shall appoint the Prime Minister. He shall terminate the
appointment of the Prime Minister when the latter tenders the resignation of
theGovernment.’’ (art. 8). The PrimeMinister thus resigns from his functions at
the demand of the President but without any coercive power from the latter. It is
even said that at the inauguration of his or her term, every PrimeMinister hands
the President an undated letter of resignation. At the same time, the Prime
Minister’s nomination or reshuffling of the calendar follows the President’s
total discretionary power. These changes thus do not automatically follow
electoral events.
The only constraint that weighs on the President when it comes to the
nomination of the Prime Minister resides in the accountability of the latter to
the national assembly. In other words, the President can choose a Prime
Minister who does not hold a seat in the majority wing of the National
assembly. Duhamel (1998: 191) speaks of a Prime Minister ‘‘acceptable to the
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Assembly.’’ This constraint gets stronger when the general political color of the
national assembly is different from the President’s political family (in case of
divided government).
Second, this constraint can be explained by the fact that the Prime Minister is
accountable to the National Assembly, which has the means to overturn govern-
ments by a vote of its own initiative. Historically, a vote of non-confidence
(during a vote of censorship motion) was only practiced once, in 1962. In a
symmetrical fashion, the Prime Minister can provoke an adherence vote of the
National Assembly by submitting his government to the confidence vote of the
parliament. If the vote is negative, the government is overturned. At the opposite,
the President is not responsible to electors for the eventual renewal of its
mandate.
Finally, the PrimeMinister is totally subordinate to the will of the President,
which translates into the constitutional formulation, which sets power sharing
as follows:
‘‘The President of the French Republic shall see that the Constitution is observed. He shall
ensure, by his arbitration, the proper functioning of the public authorities and the con-
tinuity of the State.’’ (art. 5). The Government shall determine and conduct the policy of
the Nation (art. 20). ‘‘The Prime Minister shall direct the operation of the Government.’’
(art. 21).
8.2.2 The Importance of General Policy Inauguration Address
The general policy inauguration address is of essence to a Prime Minister for
several reasons. First, it represents of the most important first moments of a
new government, ranking at the same level as the first Council of Ministers
(which is made up of the government, the Prime Minister, and the Presi-
dent). To that effect, it is a heavily publicized moment for the Prime
Minister.
Second, it is considered as one of the rarest moments when the Prime
Minister has the opportunity to explain his policy, his political agenda to the
electorate through media coverage. At a time when the President can address
the nation whenever he sees fit, the Prime Minister enjoys only one instituted
moment, abundantly reprised by the media.
Third and as its name indicates, it is an allocution on the totality of
themes and issues that are presented for government action. Of course,
through his mandate, the Prime Minister delivers several public interven-
tions, but these allocutions are usually centered on specific and succinct
themes. Thus, this inauguration address is the only moment at which the
Prime Minister can stress the overall actions of the new government as
well as its coherence. For all these reason, the inauguration address is
considered as a valuable exercise for the Prime Minister and for the
conduct of his actions.
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8.2.3 The Political Aspect of the General Policy Inauguration
Address
The form of the general policy inauguration address is totally arbitrary, but it
must respond to certain recursive contents. First, the inauguration addressmust
set the deadline that the Prime Minister gives himself. It is of course simply a
formal announcement since the duration of a government depends on the
President of the Republic. Generally the time set in the inauguration address
covers the period between the nomination of the Prime Minister and the next
legislative election.
Second, it is an inauguration address addressed at the same time to the
National Assembly and to the general public as a whole since it is the object
of several reprisals by the media. This diffusion impacts the form of the
inauguration address. The Prime Minister must set his priorities and, a
contrario, he mustn’t evoke the stakes or the public policies which are not. In
other words, the mere mentioning of a public policy is enough to be considered
as a government priority since its absence from the inauguration address means
its relegation in terms of priority.
However, the Prime Minister can, at his convenience, invoke or not the
responsibility of his government following his inauguration address. In other
words, he can ask for a vote of confidence at the National Assembly through his
general policy inauguration address, which in case of a negative result can lead
to the overturn of the government. Since the risk of defiance is very low, (see
above), a fortiori for a new government, the confidence vote is more of a
symbolic vote, which unites the parliament majority behind a government.
8.3 The General Policy Inaugural Address and Budget Action:
The Expected Consequences
Stemming from the role of the Prime Minister, the importance of the general
policy inaugural address, and the forms of this inaugural address, we can
advance certain empirical hypotheses concerning the relationships between
the content of the general policy discourse and the government budgetary
choices.
In his founding book, Christopher Hood (1983) distinguishes four basic
resources in the conduct of public policies: communication (nodality), financial
credits (treasure), legal authority (authority), and direct interventions on the
administration (organization). These four tools form the repertoire of govern-
ment actions. If we set aside the public action through authority (symbolic in
nature and not under the prerogative of a Prime Minister) as well as the
questions of organization of the public administration sphere (organization),
which remains an internal question, the two major tools a PrimeMinister has at
his disposal and addressed to the public are the inauguration address and the
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budget. Thus, we can question the links between these two dimensions of public
action. If the analysis of French governments was the object of numerous
publications, the study of the interactions between the inauguration speech
and the budget was largely ignored.
We have seen how the general policy inauguration address is the ultimate
moment for a Prime Minister to set his priorities in terms of public policy. It is
thus the ideal medium to analyze the announcements of the government and the
Prime Minister’s public policy priority. We must then be able to measure this
political prioritization through the inauguration address. In other words, we
must measure agenda setting once it has reached government decision. The
question lies in finding out if government agenda setting is translated through
the budget.
By starting with the typology advanced by Imbeau (2005), we suggest three
conceptions of relationships between the inauguration address and the action
(Walk–talk relationship), which corresponds to three empirical hypotheses to
verify.
The first hypothesis can be considered as a cynical behavior in the sense that
budgetary choices undertaken by the Prime Minister are not influenced by the
priorities announced during the general policy inauguration address. The
second hypothesis rests on the consistency between the inauguration address
and the action; since in that case the priorities set forward in the general policy
inauguration address are positively translated in the budget allocations. The
third hypothesis, at the opposite, rests on the inconsistency between words and
actions taken into consideration that priorities are translated negatively into the
budget.
From the quantification of priorities of the different Prime Ministers in
terms of public policies, we can put this measure face to face with budgetary
decisions that followed the general policy inauguration address. This relation-
ship, between political priority and budgetary decisions, rests on the hypothesis
that governmental priorities must be translated in budgetary terms. More
specifically, the higher in priority a public policy is placed on the Prime
Minster’s agenda, the more likely the increase of the concerned Ministry’s
budget. This hypothesis seems to us both realistic and reasonable. Realistic,
in the sense that the French trend in regard to public spending has been toward
a continuous increase since the Second World War not only of public interven-
tion but also of public spending. Reasonable, because the most tangible trans-
lation of priorities for a politician is the increase in the budget he allocates to
this priority. Thus, we can hardly visualize a PrimeMinister putting forward an
application domain of his public policy to then diminish the credits that he set
for this purpose.
The three hypotheses thus presented, concerning the links between the words
of Prime Ministers and budget choices, will thus be the object of an empirical
analysis dealing with the general policy inauguration address and the French
budgetary choices for the main political domains since 1958.
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8.4 Data and Estimation Strategy
Our analysis rests on the confrontation of two sorts of information concerning
the French governments since the beginnings of the Fifth Republic. On the first
hand, the inauguration address of general policy allows us to detect the main
announcements and engagements taken by the executive power. On the other
hand, the budgetary evolution allows pinpointing the main actions decided by
the government during the same period. The comparison of these two series will
allow us to know whether or not there exists a convergence between the word
and the action of French governments.
In the next part of the section, we will present the used data as well as the
statistical treatment in order to come up with the necessary information on
political attention of governments.
8.4.1 The Description of Focused Governments
Since the inception of the Fifth Republic in 1958 (until the 2007 presiden-
tial elections), France has known 18 different governments and 18 different
Prime Ministers. In light of the availability of data (those concerning the
budget), we will not integrate in our analysis the 2005–2007 De Villepin
government.
Our database thus includes 17 governments and 17 general policy
inauguration addresses undertaken by 17 different Prime Ministers. In
order to facilitate the analysis, we will consider as a single government
the ensemble of the period covered by the same Prime Minister even if this
government composition can alter during that period. For example, the
Prime Minister George Pompidou matches the single government category
in our analysis even if its composition has changed three times. This choice
has little incidence considering that the timing of the general policy inau-
guration address is linked to the Prime Minister and not to the
government.
The details of the analyzed governments in our study are given in
Table 8.1.
We can note that the time of study covers the period from 1959 to 2004,
namely five different Presidents and 43 years. Among the 17 Prime
Ministers, five were from the left and twelve from the right. Regarding
the institutional contexts evoked earlier, we have three periods of divided
government: two with a President from the left and a government from the
right (J. Chirac and E. Balladur) and with a President from the right and a
government from the left (L. Jospin). Finally, these governments have had
different durations, since the shortest term was 10 months and the longest
75 months.
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8.4.2 The General Policy Inauguration Address of the French Prime
Ministers
Every Prime Minister has thus pronounced a general policy inauguration
address in front of the National Assembly. We thus have 17 inauguration
addresses to analyze. Taking this corpus as a starting point, we would like to
highlight which public policy is a priority for the Prime Minister, and not to
make a semantic or semiotic analysis of these inauguration addresses.
To extract quantitative information from general policy inauguration
addresses, we will adopt an inductive strategy that is undertaken along several
stages, and that by getting our inspiration from the methodology developed by
Laver et al. (2003). However, contrary to the latter, our objective is not to
position Prime Ministers against each other regarding specific themes. To that
extent, our methodology is simpler and more ad hoc. More precisely, we have
constructed an analytical grid of government priorities based on the words used
in the inauguration addresses of Prime Ministers and not according to the grid
defined in an a priori fashion where the ensemble of words dealing with specific
public policy themes are listed and catalogued.
Indeed, the make up of such corpus cannot be exhaustive and cannot stand
clear of term ambiguity problems. That is why we have decided to start our
analysis based on inauguration addresses alone.
First, we measure the length of the inauguration address along two indica-
tors: the number of words present and the number of words used. On this point
(Table 8.2), we can notice important variety between Prime Ministers in terms
of inauguration address length as well as variety. The longest inauguration
address was that of Alain Juppe, which holds more than 4700 words. At the
same time, there seems to be no trend through time of neither the increase nor
the decrease in size of inauguration addresses. However, the inauguration
address with the most varied vocabulary was that of Couve de Murville, since
each word was used on an average 1.9 times. This result is logical in a sense that
his was also the shortest inauguration address delivered. Inversely, the usage
ratio of words is the highest for the longest inauguration address. The gathered
information during this first step gives us quantitative and qualitative indica-
tions on the inauguration addresses.
Second, we have detected inside each inauguration address the words refer-
ring to a specific domain in political activity. That is the first manual and raw
count before reducing the sample of terms to an acceptable number. In order to
insure the consistency of our criteria, the sorting was done independently by
each author before being opposed and any selected word of this inauguration
address was obligatory for all other inauguration addresses. This statistical
treatment allowed us to make a list of political words used in general policy
inauguration addresses.
Third, based on this list of words, we have excluded all ambiguous terms, in
other words, those which usage can have a different meaning than its political
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one. For example, the term ‘‘investment’’ can have economic connotations,
which in that sense, means an effort in capital spending. But the subtlety of
the French language has it that this term could easily have been used in a
sentence without any reference to the macroeconomic issues such as ‘‘my
investment in the resolution of this problem is total.’’ The exclusion criterion
often rests on the meaning of words. Thus, we were made aware that the
ambiguity of terms was particularly present for the verbs and their adjectives.
This third step allowed us to make up a list of 428 words dealing with public
policies.
Fourth, among the 428 words used, we have sought to attach them to a
public policy. The categorization of public policies was imposed in part by the
available budgetary data. We have chosen 12 fiscal headings (i.e., 12 series)
presented in Table 8.3.
When a word can simultaneously be matched to several different cate-
gories of public policy, we have decided to eliminate it from the list. It is
namely the case of general terms. The matching matrix between the words
and public policies is provided in Table 8.4. The final list is then made up
of 323 words.
Fifth, we apply the grid of words related to the different public policies to
each of the 17 inauguration addresses in order to get the frequency of word
occurrence.
Following a first look, we notice that the words associated with public
policies represent a minor but significant part of the inauguration addresses
since they account for between 2.4 and 4.7 percent of the words. It also seems
that the proportion is not linked to the size of the inauguration address or to the
partisan affiliation of the Prime Minister, or the incumbent President of the
French Republic.
Table 8.3 Public policies in France
Public policy Data availability
Social Affairs Yes
Agriculture Yes
Culture No
Defense Yes
Economy and Finance Yes
Education Yes
Foreign Affairs No
Industry, Research, and Trade Yes
Interior, Justice, Prime Minister Yes
Housing, Environment, Urban Affairs, and Planning Yes
Sports No
Transport and Public Works Yes
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We also note a big variety concerning of public policies quotes for each Prime
Minister’s inauguration addresses. Thus, certain issues can be totally absent
from the inauguration address, as is the case for example of PrimeMinister J-P.
Raffarin who totally ignored the agricultural issue in his 2002 speech. At the
same time, we see important differences in inauguration addresses, namely
when it comes to education, economy, finance, or social affairs.
8.4.3 The Prerogatives of the Central Government
To quantify the action of Prime Ministers, we will use the evolution of French
public spending during the period between 1959 and 2004. As depicted in
Figs. 8.1 and 8.2 since 1958 the French budget has gradually increased. The
strong breach in the trend registered in 1989 corresponds in fact to the imple-
mentation of new rules of public accountability regarding debt management,
which equally impacts the ‘‘economic and finance’’ series.
The developments regarding public policies are more versatile. Public spend-
ing levels in education and social affairs are the only series strictly increasing
during the whole period.
8.5 Estimation and Results
The object of econometric analysis is to confront the fiscal developments with
the priorities cited by French Prime Ministers in their general policy inaugura-
tion address in order to infirm or confirm the match between the two. The data
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used is mainly annual budget data, annual lexicographic information, and
qualitative data on the political structure of France for the period 1968–2004.
As a consequence, we have used a time series analysis. Before presenting the
results of our estimations, a reminder of the empirical strategy picked and the
statistical difficulties encountered is relevant. The non-stationary nature of time
series is an often-recurring phenomenon and can lead to perfectly spurious
estimations, or even ‘‘fallacious’’ ones, if one quotes the expression of Granger
and Newbold (1974), such as the primary differentiation of a deterministic
process. We perform a rigorous analysis of stationarity of French budgets by
differentiating them following a detail process presented in Appendix 1.
8.5.1 Selection of an Estimator
Once the stationary series is first differentiated, we performed several tests in
order to define the most appropriate model to the relationship we would like to
estimate. Among the different tests, we first verified the existence of auto-
correlation for residuals (preceding section), and studied the properties of
homoskedasticity for residuals. To that extent, we have run the Multiplier
Lagrange test which concluded to the rejection of disturbances of type ARCH
for eight out of ten budgetary series. Only the public spending of theMinister of
Interior and of the Minister of Defense followed a process which allows an
estimation based on a GARCH model if we only want to explain these public
spending by their past. That is why we have chosen to retain two estimation
strategies. The first, AR(1), allows an auto-regressive process of order 1. In
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other words, the disturbances in t–1 are correlated to the disturbances in t to
which a spherical disturbance was added. (Greene 2003). Thus the model takes
the general following form: Bt = bXt + et with et = ret – 1 + mt.
The second estimation strategy aims at selecting a model with lagged vari-
ables (VMR). Keele and Kelly (2006) specify that this strategy allows us to
eliminate the autocorrelation considering hence forth the fact that a lagged
variable is introduced. The model thus takes the following form: Bt = aBt – 1 +
bXt–1 + et.
In each case, an OLS estimator can be selected whether the expected value is
zero, whether residuals are homoskedastic, and whether residuals are not
serially correlated.
8.5.2 Definition of Variables
8.5.2.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the level of public spending the elected government
engages in every year. This level of public spending can be distinguished in a
functional manner allowing the study of the evolution of the ten spending
categories: agricultural, education, military, interior and justice, lodging, trans-
port, industry, social affairs, economy and finance, and total public spending.
We have simultaneously taken into account the level of spending in volume
and the annual rate of change. If the difference between the two measures does
not affect estimations, reasoning in terms of annual variation renders a first
differentiation unnecessary. These variables were corrected by the OCDE
general spending expenditure deflator.
8.5.2.2 Independent Variables
The independent variables of our model gather three categories of variables.
The first category related to the economic structure of France: we have picked
the belated variable of public spending expenditures (Bt–1) and the rate of
growth of the GDP (GDPt) for the period 1961–2004 (3 variables are missing
from this series.)
The second category of variables concerns political data.We have chosen the
partisan affiliation of the government in charge of voting the annual budget,
through the introduction of a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for a right-
wing government, and 0 otherwise. Considering the partisan divisions in French
political life and the importance accorded to elections and partisan control of
government, one might expect substantial differences in spending patterns by
governments of the Left and the Right. A second seemingly similar variable
deals with the partisanship affiliation of the incumbent French President.
Finally, we have selected dummy variables to capture the temporal effect of
the instauration of a new government and the presence of a divided government
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(France has experienced three periods of divided government; between
1986–1988, 1993–1995, and 1997–2002).
Finally, the third category of variables concerns those linked with the general
policy inauguration address of Prime Ministers. We first took into considera-
tion both the cumulative number of words (Nbwords_SBt) and the distinctive
number of words (NbwordsD_SBt) related to the functional category of public
spending. The relevancy in relying on these two variables is due to the fact that
words repetition provides precious information as the expected intensity of the
Prime Minister’s action. But in the same time it reduces the knowledge of his
policy’s multidimensional aspect. For example, repeating ten times the word
‘‘agriculture’’ gives an indication as to the intention of the Prime Minister
without specifying the extent of his action (captured by the use of several
words relevant to the agricultural fiscal heading). We have also ‘‘normalized’’
the distribution of the two series by citing the number of words in each func-
tional field in relation to the total number of words pronounced by each Prime
Minister. Thus, we can control the differences in speech length (Table 8.3).
Finally, we have put together a discount rate of the inauguration addresses in
order to capture the distance effect between the general policy inauguration
address and the real fiscal policy of the government in place. More precisely, we
have considered that the absence in variance of each lexicographic series for
each legislature posed important statistical analysis difficulties. That is why we
have built two newmultiplicative independent variables. The first multiplies the
number of words in functional category by the ratio 1/n, n being the length of
the legislature. A similar construction, but more conformed to the non-linear
representation, takes into account the powerful function of the discount rate. In
that way, we can take into consideration the amplification of the distance
between the inauguration address and the nth year of government budgetary
engagement.
8.5.3 Results
Table 8.5 presents the results of estimations conducted by each budget series
between 1958 and 2004. The absence of data regarding the GDP between 1958
and 1961 has reduced our sample made up of 44 observations by budgetary
series.
In a general manner, we must keep in mind that the general policy inaugura-
tion address does not exert a significant influence on the annual budgetary
variations, at the exception of two public policies: that led by the Ministry of
transport and public works and that conducted by the Ministry of agriculture.
In the case of transport and public works policy, the more we consider the
elapsing of time from the original general policy inauguration address, the more
the level of the transport and public works Ministry’s budget effort tends to
decrease. In that sense, the action of the French government is more discursive
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than budgetary. We can go even further by saying that more attention is given
to the inauguration address and very little to the budget agenda. This result is
not really surprising because the decision to engage in infrastructure public
spending (TGV network, road network, navigable waters, airport platforms) is
often questioned in France as illustrated by governments alternating and the
choice of land-use planning. In the case of agricultural affairs, the intensity of
the inauguration address measured by the number of words defining the agri-
cultural action of the government exerts a counter-productive effect on the
budgetary variation of the Ministry of agriculture. Indeed, the negative sign
of the variable Nbwords_SBt suggests that the more the Prime Minister grants
importance to his government action priorities, the less the corresponding
budgetary engagement is high. In the French case, this result has to be put in
perspective of the rise in power of the common agricultural politics, which in
part took the role of state public intervention in terms of direct intervention
(support of agricultural prices and surplus subsidy).
Among the regularly significant variables for each budgetary series, the
partisan affiliation of the government shows us that governments from the
right have a general tendency to increase the level of public spending in 4–9
ministries studied.We talk here of military spending, agricultural spending, and
that of the Ministry of economy and finance and social public spending. As
much as the first three series are faithful to French tradition of governments of
the right, as much as the increase in social spending is surprising because we
could have conceived it to be a domain reserved for budgetary ‘‘leniancy’’ from
left governments, in parts due to the succession of unemployment fighting
programs (policies of massive employment). Concerning defense public spend-
ing, it is important to note that the implementation of military planning law
since the beginning of the 1960s reduces the room tomaneuver for governments
to the extent that theymutually commit to respect amilitary budget endeavor in
the allocated time. This result is quite closed with those obtained by Baumgart-
ner et al. (2009) who find only a small number of statistically significant
differences and when we do find them, governments of the Right are the higher
spenders.
Finally and contrary to the incremental theory underlyingWildasky’s (1964)
or Lindblom’s (1959) model, our results highlighting budgetary choices taken
last year do not hold a constant explanatory power. Indeed, the incremental
model does not function properly when it comes to the public spending of the
Ministry of Interior, social affairs, transport, industry, and research. This result
leads us to distance ourselves from those of Sine´ (2006: 114), which enunciates
an incremental relation of the French budget between 1980 and 2005. At the
opposite, these results easily conform to the existence of punctuated equilibrium
characterized by the sequences of incremental budgetary variations and by
sudden changes. By measuring the kurtosis of budgetary French series between
1868 and 2002 (135 years), Baumgartner et al. (2006) accredited the thesis of
punctuated budgetary variations.
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Thus, the hypothesis of the cynical behavior of French governments in
regard to general policy inauguration address seems to be confirmed.
Only the action of the Minister of agriculture stems from an incoherent
behavior because priorities are not translated by decreasing budgetary
choices. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the general struc-
ture of the models estimated lying on the construction of non-contextua-
lized lexicographic variables do not allow us to accurately distinguish a
priority engagement.
8.6 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a first attempt of combining French Prime Minister’s
speeches and fiscal priorities in France since the beginning of the Fifth Republic.
Our empirical results mainly show that there is no systematic relationship
between the discursive voluntarism and the fiscal choices. Consequently it is
consistent with our cynical hypothesis of the Prime Minister’s fiscal choices.
We can advance three main explanations for better understanding the lack of
influence of the Prime Minister’s speech on policy budget.
First, measuring the fiscal prioritization may not be relevant. We measure it
using the annual change, but the relative annual change could bemore valuable.
Indeed, the priority of a public policy, such as housing for instance, could be
more fitted by its annual change regarding the average annual change or the
annual change of other public policies.
Second, the cynicism of the Prime Minister could be explained by the fact
that the government does not control the activity of the bureaucrats. The fiscal
autonomy of the public administration can have two sources. First, the minis-
ters ignore the directives of the Prime Minister for multiple political or bureau-
cratic reasons. For instance, the President can settle a dispute between a
minister and the Prime Minister in favor of the Minister. Another example in
line with the Niskanen model of economic theory of bureaucracy is that a
Minister cannot control her administration in the management of the budget
process. Second, the fiscal administration which actually manages the budget-
ary relationship with the ministers could not advocate the Prime Minister’s
choices. In France, the administration has a crucial and central role in the
budgetary process that gives it a great power (Sine´, 2006), notably in fiscal
developments.
A last explanation that is not directly linked to the budgetary process rests on
the rules of democracy and notably the electoral systems. Indeed, in a major-
itarian system where party coalitions have never prevented a French govern-
ment to be defeated during a legislature (for the Fifth Republic), there is no
immediate cost for not respecting her political pledges. In a sense, electoral
systems can matter and affect the dissonance policy. A future research agenda
could emerge from this relationship between electoral rules of the game and
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officials’ behavior and thus provide a sort of meta-analysis of political
dissonance.
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Appendix1: The Stationarity of Data
The non-stationary nature of time series is an often-recurring phenomenon and
can lead to perfectly spurious estimations, or even ‘‘fallacious’’ ones, if one
reprises the expression of Granger et al. (1974), such as the primary differentia-
tion of a deterministic process. Ever since the works of Nelson and Plosser
(1982), the case of non-stationary most frequently analyzed were based on two
types of processes: the deterministic process TS (trend stationary), also called
‘‘the non-persistent property of shocks,’’ and the stochastic process DS (differ-
ence stationary). We have thus put into place a strategy of tests aimed at
identifying for each of our variables those that have been affected by the TS
and the DS process.
We will present here, in three stages, the stationary test for the entire French
budgetary spending. This procedure was conducted for each of the time vari-
able. The first stage consists in estimating the following equation:
Bt ¼ fBt1 þ cþ bTþ et (relationA)
where Bt is the budget in t, T the tendency, c a constant, and e the error term.We
will carry out a test of unitary root and obtain the value of the OLS estimators
of the different parameters of the relationship. The statistics tf^ ¼ 3:26
informs us of the presence of a unitary root. Compared to the threshold
tabulated by Dickey-Fuller (Ca = – 3.67), the null hypothesis of unitary root
is accepted since tf^4Ca. This latter result must be validated by verifying that
the relation A is the appropriate model. For that, we test the nullity of the
coefficient associated to the trend under the condition of the existence of a
unitary root, i.e., the following test:
HA0 ¼ ðc; b;fÞ ¼ ðc; 0; 0Þ or Bt ¼ cþ et (relation B)
The non-constrained model (relation A) and the constrained model (relation B
under H0) are successively estimated. The Fisher statistics provides a value
(FB=1.296) inferior to the critical value (Fa=7.24), that enables us to accept
the null hypothesis and then the test of non-stationary with the trend T.
Consequently, we have to restart the same test by keeping only a constant
term, such as:
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Bt ¼ fBt1 þ cþ e (relationC)
After implementing a unitary root test, we can accept the null hypothesis of
unitary root (f=0). As previously, we verify the validity of such a result by
testing the nullity of the constant under the condition of unitary root, i.e., the
following test: Hc0 ¼ ðc;fÞ ¼ ð0; 0Þ. Finally that consists in testing the null
hypothesis for all coefficients of the relation C. By comparing the Fisher
statistics and the critical value of Dickey-Fuller, we conclude that we cannot
accept the null hypothesis and then we have to maintain the constant termwhen
we estimate the relation C.
In conclusion, we can confirm that the series of French budgets between 1968
and 2004 was issued from a non-stationary type I(1) process, and can be
represented by : lnBt=c+lnBt–1+et (with i.i.d. (0,s
2)). To turn this series sta-
tionary, all we have to do is to differentiate it. We were able to verify that once
differentiated, this series held the properties of white noise and that it wasn’t
auto-correlated since by definition E(et,et–k) = 0 if k is different from zero. To
the extent where the series of French budgets is not auto-correlated, the process
et can be compared to a white noise and thus validates both the set of Dickey-
Fuller statistical tests’ asymptotic distributions and the conclusions we have
advanced in regards to the non-stationary of the series.
All the stationary tests (Dfueller) allowed us to put into evidence that close to
95%of our temporal variables were not stationary, but that a first differentiation
was sufficient to correct the bias. Then, an autocorrelation test was systematically
run for each tested relation. According to Bourbonnais (1998) the Q statistics of
Ljung-Box to test the hypothesis of auto-correlation allowed us to identify certain
cases of auto-correlation, which required the transformation of the functional
relation by
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 r^2
p
(We present in Table 8.5 the estimation of the parameter
ﬃﬃﬃ
r^
p
for the budget series concerned by a problem of autocorrelation).
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